Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods of Loan Covenant Violations by Liu, Allen
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
4-2011
Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods of
Loan Covenant Violations
Allen Liu
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/75
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Liu, Allen, "Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods of Loan Covenant Violations" (2011). Wharton Research Scholars. 75.
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/75
Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods of Loan Covenant
Violations
Abstract
We present empirical evidence on acquirer firms that have violated or are about to violate a loan covenant
within four quarters of undergoing an acquisition. We find that firms that violate a covenant within the four
quarters before the acquisition announcement have the highest announcement period abnormal returns,
while firms that violate a covenant within the four quarters after the acquisition announcement but not within
the four quarters before it have the sharpest decline in abnormal returns after the acquisition announcement.
Also, firms that violate or are about to violate a loan covenant within four quarters have a significantly lower
mean target firm deal size than those that have not violated covenants within those time periods. Such results
indicate that when firms violate or are about to violate a loan covenant, corporate governance shifts in power
cause creditors to enforce stricter rules on management’s actions, making sure that the acquisitions that
management pursues adds to firm value.
Keywords
loan covenant, abnormal returns
Disciplines
Business | Corporate Finance
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/75
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods  
of Loan Covenant Violations 
 
 
 
Allen Liu 
 
Faculty Advisor: Professor Greg Nini 
 
Wharton Research Scholars 2010 - 2011 
 
The Wharton School  
University of Pennsylvania 
April 2011  
1 
 
Corporate Acquisitions Around Time Periods of Loan Covenant Violations 
 
Abstract 
We present empirical evidence on acquirer firms that have violated or are about to violate a loan 
covenant within four quarters of undergoing an acquisition. We find that firms that violate a 
covenant within the four quarters before the acquisition announcement have the highest 
announcement period abnormal returns, while firms that violate a covenant within the four 
quarters after the acquisition announcement but not within the four quarters before it have the 
sharpest decline in abnormal returns after the acquisition announcement. Also, firms that violate 
or are about to violate a loan covenant within four quarters have a significantly lower mean 
target firm deal size than those that have not violated covenants within those time periods. Such 
results indicate that when firms violate or are about to violate a loan covenant, corporate 
governance shifts in power cause creditors to enforce stricter rules on management’s actions, 
making sure that the acquisitions that management pursues adds to firm value.  
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I. Introduction 
 Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010) reveal that many corporate governance shifts of power occur 
when a firm violates a loan covenant, as creditors rewrite covenants and set rules that restrict the 
borrower’s actions. For example, creditors may limit capital expenditure spending and which 
types of acquisitions are permitted. Regarding the topic of acquisitions, the results from Betton, 
Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) and Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) reveal that 
abnormal returns are significantly positive around the announcement period for an acquisition. 
Combining the material of all these papers, we wonder about the effect of loan covenant 
violations on the effectiveness of a borrower’s business decisions, as shifts of power occur across 
the parties related to the borrower. We use acquisition announcement period abnormal returns to 
measure this effect based on the stock market’s perception of the acquirer. 
 We hope that our research provides a better understanding of corporate governance, 
allowing readers to have a clearer view of who is in charge (creditors, board of directors, 
management, etc.) and how the actions of certain groups influence the company’s market value. 
From our analysis of acquisition announcement period returns, readers will have a better 
understanding of whether firms make better business decisions after they violate loan covenants 
and which factors affect the market’s perception of these decisions the most. 
 The main research question that we focus on is whether there are differences among 
acquirer firms that have violated a loan covenant within the four quarters before the acquisition 
announcement (Violation Before Acquisition), acquirer firms that have violated a loan covenant 
within the four quarters after the acquisition announcement but not within the four quarters 
before (Violation After Acquisition), and acquirer firms that have not experienced such 
violations (No Violation). Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition act as 
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treatment groups, while No Violation acts as a control group. The differences that we are 
interested in are those for acquisition announcement period abnormal returns as well as those for 
the following acquisition type characteristics: target firm deal size, industry match between 
acquirer and target, and deal financing type.  
 We first compare the abnormal returns for the three samples by using Eventus, an event 
study program, and graphing the mean cumulative abnormal returns to determine the trends and 
magnitudes of each sample’s mean cumulative abnormal return across time and around the 
announcement period. From the graphs, we notice that Violation Before Acquisition’s 
cumulative mean abnormal return rose the most dramatically at the announcement period, and 
Violation After Acquisition’s cumulative mean abnormal return falls the most dramatically after 
the announcement period. The rise in Violation Before Acquisition’s cumulative mean abnormal 
return at the announcement period may support the hypothesis that after loan covenant 
violations, creditors control the firm’s management more strictly, limiting the allowed 
acquisitions to only those that generate value to the firm. The stock market’s favorable view of 
this shift in corporate governance may be reflected in the rise in abnormal returns. Violation 
After Acquisition’s dramatic drop in mean cumulative abnormal return after the announcement 
period may indicate both that the market overreacts positively to acquisition announcement, and 
that the stock market’s pessimistic prediction of an impending loan covenant violation begins to 
override its optimistic sentiment towards the acquisition. 
For the acquisition type characteristics, we use two-tailed t-tests to test for statistically 
significant mean differences. We find that the only significant differences occur for target firm 
deal size between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation, and between Violation After 
Acquisition and No Violation. This may be evidence that when firms violate a covenant or are 
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about to violate a covenant, creditors may limit the deal size of acquisitions to avoid overly large 
acquisitions, which may be both too expensive and too risky. 
The results of our analysis reveal that stock markets have favorable announcement period 
reactions towards companies that undergo an acquisition after violating a loan covenant and that 
acquirers that violate a loan covenant have smaller target firm deal sizes than those that do not. 
These results may support Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), providing further evidence that many 
corporate governance shifts of power occur when a firm violates a loan covenant, as creditors 
rewrite covenants and set rules that restrict the borrower’s actions, such as which types of 
acquisitions are permitted.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II touches upon background 
information, including explanations of concepts and research results from related literature. 
Section III outlines the hypotheses and research that supports them. In Section IV, we explain the 
details of our datasets. Next, we explain our methodology for data analysis in Section V. Then 
we analyze the results of our research in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Background 
A. Covenant Violations 
 Debt covenants are conditions in credit agreements that direct or restrict the borrower’s 
actions. There are three categories of covenants: affirmative, negative, and financial. Affirmative 
covenants force the borrower to take certain actions, such as meeting GAAP standards of 
accounting, maintaining equipment and buying insurance, and operating within legal bounds. 
Negative covenants restrict the borrower from taking certain actions, such as shifting the firm’s 
main business, divesting assets, and making excessive capital expenditures. Financial covenants 
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are accounting-based risk and performance limits, restricting measures, such as a firm’s leverage 
and interest coverage. 
Covenants occur in all types of debt agreements, including bond and note indentures, but 
are typically much stricter in private loan agreements (Kahan and Tuckman (1993), Gilson and 
Warner (1998), Verde (1999), and Sansone and Taylor (2007)). Private loan contracts have 
maintenance covenants, meaning that the borrower must comply with the covenant consistently, 
for example by maintaining a certain debt/EBITDA ratio on a quarterly basis. On the other hand, 
bond indentures have incurrence covenants, for which the borrower only needs to comply with 
the covenant during a particular event, such as only having to maintain a certain debt/EBITDA 
ratio during a debt or equity issuance. Between the two types of contracts, private loan contracts 
are much stricter because they must use the more restrictive maintenance-based covenants. 
 Violations of covenants are considered events of default, which allow the creditor to 
demand immediate repayment of (or “accelerate”) the entire loan balance. However, the creditor 
rarely accelerates the loan and instead, usually renegotiates the contract with the borrower. Such 
renegotiations can lead to modifications of the loan terms and more restrictions on certain 
metrics of the firm, such as stricter limits on leverage, capital expenditures, and acquisitions (See 
Figure 1). After a covenant violation, clear limits on capital expenditures are likely to be set for 
the first time, and ratio-based covenants are replaced by restrictions on the level of EBITDA 
(Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010)). Figures 2 and 3 reveal that loan covenant violations cause 
decreases in a firm’s abnormal returns. 
B. Acquisitions 
 Much existing research covers acquisitions. For a summary of various types of research 
on acquisitions, see “Corporate Takeovers” by Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008). Our interest 
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in this paper lies in the studies concerning takeover gains. These studies use a sample of 15,987 
initial control bids by public bidders for public or private targets, in the time period from 1980 to 
2005. For the cumulative abnormal stock returns, an average daily abnormal stock return is 
measured for firm j over event window k as the event parameter ARjk according to  
rjt = αj + βjrmt + ∑ 

	
  + εjt, t = day{−293, ..., end}  
where rjt is the return (in logarithmic form) to firm j over day t, rmt is the value-weighted market 
return, and dkt is a dummy variable that equals one if day t is in the kth event window and zero 
otherwise. Day 0 is the day of the initial control bid, and days -1 to 1 is the announcement 
period. For the announcement period for the whole sample of 15,987 initial control bids, the 
mean cumulative abnormal stock return is 0. 73% and has a z-statistic of -2.5297. This indicates 
that the return is significantly positive, at a level of confidence of 0.01. However, 49.39% of the 
sample size is made up of positive returns, revealing that most returns are negative. 
 Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) extends this data analysis further by dividing their 
sample of 15,987 initial control bids into subsamples based of the following factors: bidder 
market capitalization of the target, whether the target was public or private, form of initial bid, 
method of payment of initial offer, and time period of initial offer. Out of these factors, they 
determined that the two key drivers of acquirer (bidder) returns are bidder size and the target’s 
status as public or private. For bidder market capitalization subsamples, which allow one to 
examine the effect of the bidder’s size on announcement period returns, the sample is divided 
into the lowest quartile and highest quartile. For the lowest quartile, consisting of 3,995 initial 
bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is 4.04%, the z-statistic is 21.7874, and 58.27% of 
returns are positive. For the highest quartile, consisting of 10,480 initial bids, the mean 
cumulative abnormal return is -0.49%, the z-statistic is -17.5109, and 45.99% of returns are 
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positive. These results indicate that the returns are inversely related to bidder size, with the 
lowest quartile having a mean cumulative abnormal return 4.53% higher than that of the highest 
quartile. One can also see the influence of the target’s status as public or private on the acquirer’s 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return. For an acquirer with a public target, of which 
there are 6,301 initial bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -0.87%, the z-statistic is -
19.0462, and 42.69% of returns are positive. For an acquirer with a private target, of which there 
are 9,686 initial bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is 1.76%, the z-statistic is 12.1118, 
and 53.75% of returns are positive. Therefore, acquirers with private targets have higher 
cumulative abnormal returns than those with public targets, with acquirers with private targets 
having a cumulative abnormal return that is higher by 2.63%.  
Overall, the best-case scenario for returns consists of a small bidder (lowest quartile of 
market capitalization), private target, and all-stock payment, producing an average bidder 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return of 6.46%. The worst-case scenario for returns 
consists of a large bidder (highest quartile of market capitalization), public target, and all-stock 
payment (again), producing an average bidder announcement period cumulative abnormal return 
of -2.21%.  
  Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) also present conclusions relevant to our 
research. They use cross-sectional regressions, to control for various factors for a sample of 414 
US industrial firms that acquired assets between 1986 and 2001. The announcement period is 
from days -1 to 1 with day 0 as the announcement of the asset purchase, and cumulative 
abnormal returns are based on a single-factor market model estimated from day -255 to day -46 
for each firm. The results reveal that buyer announcement period returns increase directly with 
buyer leverage and are higher for buyers with private debt than those with public debt. Also, 
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announcement period returns have an inverse relationship with buyer size, number of buyer’s 
anti-takeover provisions, and relative size of acquisition. For the full sample, the announcement 
period mean cumulative abnormal return is 1.238%, which is statistically positive at the 0.01 
level of significance.   
 Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) split up the sample to analyze the data for 
debt level and type of debt. For debt level, the sample is divided into high debt and low debt 
asset buyers, with “high debt asset buyers” defined as firms with a total debt-to-total asset ratio 
higher than median ratio for all firms that bought assets in the same year and “low debt asset 
buyers” as the opposite. The mean cumulative abnormal return for high debt asset buyers, which 
make up a sample size of 203, is 1.813%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 
level of significance. The mean cumulative abnormal return for low debt asset buyers, which 
make up a sample size of 211, is 1.686%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 
level of significance. From these mean cumulative abnormal returns it is evident that asset 
buyers with higher total debt-to-total asset ratios have higher returns, confirming that 
announcement period returns increase along with buyer leverage. For debt type, the sample is 
divided into public debt and private debt asset buyers, with “public debt asset buyers” defined as 
firms with a public-to-private debt ratio greater than one, and “private debt asset buyers” as the 
opposite. The mean cumulative abnormal return for private debt asset buyers, which make up a 
sample size of 170, is 2.343%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of 
significance. The mean cumulative abnormal return for public debt asset buyers, which make up 
a sample size of 244, is 0.469%. These mean cumulative abnormal returns indicate that private 
debt asset buyers have higher announcement period returns than public debt asset buyers.  
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III. Hypotheses 
A. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
 We think that announcement period abnormal returns for Violation Before Acquisition 
and Violation After Acquisition are larger than those for No Violation. We also feel that 
Violation Before Acquisition has the highest abnormal returns and that No Violation has the 
lowest. Based on the findings from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), creditors impose tighter 
restrictions on borrowers following a loan violation. Therefore, we think that these restrictions 
only allow firms to make acquisitions that add to the firms’ value, and that the benefits of these 
acquisitions are reflected by the stock price around the announcement period.  
In addition, we think that the acquirers that Violation After Acquisition have the second 
highest abnormal returns because even though they have not yet actually violated a loan 
covenant, their financial position must be deteriorating, leading to their eventual violation. 
Therefore, even though creditors have not imposed rules as strict as those following a loan 
violation, creditors are likely to caution and guide the struggling company. A possible alternative 
hypothesis for Violation Before Acquisition having the highest abnormal returns may be that 
these firms have suffered an overdramatic decline in their stock price after the actual loan 
covenant violation. As a result, the stock market sees the ability to carry out an acquisition as a 
sign that the market overreacted to the violation, resulting in enormously positive stock returns. 
B. Types of Acquisitions 
 In addition to our predictions for announcement period abnormal returns, we think that 
Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition have smaller target sizes, less 
across industry deals, and more all-stock financed deals. In addition, we think that acquirers that 
have violated a loan covenant within the previous four quarters exhibit these characteristics the 
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most. These predictions come from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), which indicates that the cash 
acquisitions scaled by average assets decreases greatly after a covenant violation. We think that 
this implies that creditors may limit the size of all acquisitions that occur close to the date that a 
covenant violation occurs or is likely to occur, in order to guide the firm to engage only in 
acquisitions that increase the firm’s value. We also think that these creditors guide violating 
acquirers towards deals in which the industry of the buyer and seller match and most likely result 
in higher returns due to synergies. In addition, since Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) reveals 
that acquirers with all-stock deals yield the higher announcement period abnormal returns, we 
think that creditors make sure that violating acquirers pursue deals that are financed by stock. 
However, we are unsure about this hypothesis because the same research shows that all-stock 
deals also yield the lowest announcement period abnormal returns. 
 
IV. Data 
A. Previous Construction 
 The two sets of data used in our research are a sample of acquisitions and a sample of 
covenant violations. One set of data consists of 15,211 acquisitions from 1996 to 2010. We use 
about 8,750 of these acquisitions when analyzing the announcement period abnormal returns 
with Eventus, an event study application explained in our “Methodology” section. The data for 
the acquisitions are all U.S. deals for nonfinancial companies from Zephyr, a database of deal 
information, such as details of deals, deal rumors, and financial summaries and structures of 
firms involved in deals. For more information on Zephyr, see 
http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Economic-and-M-A/M-A/ZEPHYR.aspx. Our acquisition 
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data includes the rumor date, date of acquisition announcement, deal completion date, deal value, 
percentage of initial and final stake, acquirer and target names, and acquirer CUSIP.  
 The other set of data consists of covenant violation information from Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi (2010), financial information for firms on a quarterly basis taken from Compustat. 
Compustat is a database of U.S. and Canadian fundamental and market information for over 
24,000 companies, providing annual and quarterly financial statements and supplemental data. 
For more information on Compustat, see http://www.compustat.com/myproducts.aspx. For our 
data, the broadest sample of Compustat observations contains of 7,661 non-financial U.S. firms 
and 181,702 firm-quarter observations from the second quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 
2008. The main focus of this data is an indicator of whether or not the firm reports a violation of 
a financial covenant during the corresponding quarter.  
Construction of the covenant violation data begins with data for all nonfinancial U.S. 
firms in Compustat from1996 to 2008, initially limited to only firms with average book assets 
greater than $10 million in 2000 dollars and to firm-quarter observations with five available data 
items (total assets, total sales, common shares outstanding, closing share price, and the calendar 
quarter of the filing). Next, Nini, Smith, and Sufi investigate the firms’ 10-K and 10-Q SEC 
filings, using a text-search algorithm that first locates the word “covenant” in the filing, and then 
conditional on finding the word “covenant,” searches for the following five terms within seven 
lines surrounding the initial hit: “waiv,” “viol,” “in default,” “modif,” and “not in compliance.” 
Then they manually check the filings mentioning covenant violations. Finally, they merge the 
data from Compustat with the data generated from their algorithm. 
Our data centers on new financial covenant violations, defined as financial covenant 
violations for firms that have not violated a covenant in the previous four quarters. The focus is 
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on new financial covenant violations because they reveal the initial measure of creditor 
intervention, providing the cleanest identification of the effect of violations on corporate 
behavior. A firm-quarter observation is only included in the sample if there exist four previous 
quarters to measure whether a given violation is new. For more details about the construction of 
this data, see Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010). 
B. Formation of Samples 
 The previous construction of data from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010) allow us to start with 
a 10,722 sample size for acquisitions and 273,509 sample size for covenant violations. We have 
to arrange the data into three separate samples, for acquisitions that occurred within four quarters 
after a covenant violation, acquisitions that occurred within four quarters before a covenant 
violation but without a covenant violation within the previous four quarters, and acquisitions that 
fit neither of the previous two categories. This way, the first two samples, in which recent 
violations occurred, would be treatment samples, and the last sample, in which recent violations 
did not occur, could serve as an overall control sample. 
To form the samples, we first match the CUSIP numbers for acquirers in the dataset for 
acquisitions with those for acquirers in the dataset for covenant violations. Then we place the 
data that did not match up by CUSIP into the control sample, generating a smaller sample size to 
work with. Then we write an Excel macro that compares all the acquisitions’ announcement 
dates with covenant violations dates to identify the acquisitions in which violations occurred 
within four quarters. The announcement date we use is the earliest of the actual announcement 
date, rumor date, and actual acquisition date, to represent the earliest date that acquisition 
information is leaked to the stock market. After we obtain this data, we put the data that do not 
match the date criteria into the control group. Then we use Excel to sort the remaining data into 
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acquisitions that occurred within four quarters before the covenant violation and acquisitions that 
occurred within four quarters after the covenant violation without a covenant violation within 
four quarters before, completing our two treatment samples. We end up with a sample size of 
598 for Violation Before Acquisition, 569 for Violation After Acquisition, and 9555 for No 
Violation. These sample sizes sometimes diminish slightly during our analysis due to some 
acquirer data experiencing incompatibility with Eventus and lack of certain acquisition details. 
C. Sample Characteristics 
 After forming the samples, we collect data on the target firm deal size, industry match, 
and deal financing for each of the three samples. The target deal size, denominated in millions of 
assets, is from the previously constructed dataset. For the industry match, we use Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which are used to classify a company’s main business. We 
check if the acquirer and target have the same first two digits in their SIC codes, which represent 
the major industry group, and if they have the same first full SIC codes, which represent the 
industry, a more specific classification. For industry match we use a dummy variable for each of 
the two situations, assigning 1 if the SIC codes match up and assigning 0 otherwise. Next, we 
look for what type of deal financing each of the three samples use, checking to see if each 
transaction is financed mainly by cash or stock. We focus on cash and stock because these make 
up the vast majority of financing types. We also use a dummy variable for each of the two 
situations, cash and stock, assigning 1 if the acquisition uses the given financing type and 0 
otherwise. For each characteristic for each sample, we calculate the required numbers to perform 
t-tests to judge the statistical significance of differences between two samples at a time: mean 
difference, standard deviations, and sample sizes. 
D. Summary Statistics 
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 Table 1 presents our summary statistics. For each of the three samples, we reveal the 
mean cumulative abnormal returns and sample sizes for days -30 to 30 and days -3 to 2, the two 
time windows that we focus on the most. We also reveal the mean and sample sizes for the 
acquisition type characteristics: target firm deal size, industry match and major industry group 
match, and cash and stock financing. Later, we will expand upon and analyze both the mean 
cumulative abnormal return data and acquisition type characteristics data mentioned in our 
summary statistics. 
 
V. Methodology 
 We use Eventus to determine the abnormal returns around the announcement period and 
compare cross-sectional returns. Eventus performs event studies, allowing the user to have 
control over estimation periods and cumulative return windows, as well as a choice of 
benchmarks, such as comparison period mean returns, market returns, and the market model. For 
more information on Eventus, see Arnold R. Cowen’s Eventus 8.0 Users Guide. The 
announcement date is day 0, with day -1 as the day before the announcement. We focus on days -
3 to 2. Eventus measures the abnormal return as 
 ARit = Rit – E(Rit|Xt) 
given that i is the firm and t is the event date. Rit is the actual ex-post return of security i, and 
E(Rit|Xt) is the expected return without conditioning that the event will take place over the event 
window. For a conceptual diagram regarding Eventus, see Figure 4.  
For Eventus, we set the estimation period used to measure E(Rit|Xt) as the default with 
the end before the event date  as day -46, the minimum estimation length as 3 days, and the 
maximum estimation length as 255 days. We find the mean daily abnormal returns and mean 
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cumulative abnormal return for time windows for days -30 to 30, -30 to -2, -3 to 2, 1 to 30, -1 to 
1, -2 to 2, and -2 to 30. Each time, we use a single-factor market model estimated based on 
ordinary least squares for the estimation period. We also select options for both the equally 
weighted index and value-weighted index. The equally weighted index weighs all NYSE, 
AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks equally, while the value-weighted index weighs them based on value. 
Our focus is on the time windows for days -30 to 30, which give the most comprehensive view 
of the trend of the abnormal returns across time, and days -3 to 2, which centers in on the trend 
of the abnormal returns across time around the acquisition period. We graph the mean 
cumulative returns across time for these two time windows for both the equally weighted index 
and value-weighted index to visually capture the trends.  
 Next, we look for differences in target firm deal size, industry match, and deal financing 
across the three samples. We use independent t-tests for samples of unequal sizes and unequal 
variances to compare two samples at a time for each characteristic, in order to determine whether 
the differences in the means for characteristics between the two samples are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test. We use the following formula for 
t-tests: 
 
  
VI. Results 
A. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
 For Figure 5, we can notice clear trends in the graphs of the mean cumulative abnormal 
return for days -30 to 30. The trends are consistent between the equally weighted index and 
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value-weighted index. Well before the acquisition date, the mean cumulative abnormal returns of 
the three samples are very similar and slightly below 0.00%. However, on the acquisition 
announcement date, the abnormal return for Violation Before Acquisition increases significantly 
more than that for Violation After Acquisition. The abnormal return for Violation After 
Acquisition increases significantly more than No Violation, which stays close to a 0.00% mean 
cumulative abnormal return. For graphs of the time window for days -3 to 2, see Figure 6 and the 
corresponding cumulative abnormal return from Table 2. Table 2 indicates that for the equally 
weighted index, Violation Before Acquisition experiences a 3.07% mean cumulative abnormal 
return, while Violation After Acquisition experiences 1.52% and No Violation experiences 
0.72%. For the value-weighted index, Violation Before Acquisition experiences a 3.00% mean 
cumulative abnormal return, while Violation After Acquisition experiences 1.51% and No 
Violation experiences 0.65%. 
 The much greater increase in abnormal return for Violation Before Acquisition may 
support our hypothesis that after a company violates a loan covenant, creditors only allow the 
company’s management to make acquisitions that add value to the firm. The stock market 
recognizes this and views the acquisition as favorable to the shareholders, reflecting the high 
abnormal returns during the announcement period. We also think that for the Violation After 
Acquisition acquirers, the creditors can predict that these companies may violate a loan covenant 
soon. Therefore, they are strict in only allowing the company’s management to make 
acquisitions that benefit the firm’s value but are less strict than they would be for a firm that has 
actually violated a loan covenant. As a result, the announcement period abnormal return is higher 
than that for the control group No Violation but lower than that for Violation Before Acquisition. 
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After this point, the mean cumulative abnormal returns for all three samples drop. 
However, Violation After Acquisition drops the most dramatically, and No Violation drops the 
least dramatically, falling much less than the others from days 1 to 30. The differences in such 
drops are evident from both Figure 5 and Table 2’s results for the time window for days 1 to 30. 
Table 2 indicates that for the equally weighted index, Violation After Acquisition experiences a -
3.78% mean cumulative abnormal return, while Violation Before Acquisition experiences -
1.53% and No Violation experiences -1.05%. For the value-weighted index, Violation After 
Acquisition experiences a -4.43% mean cumulative abnormal return, while Violation Before 
Acquisition experiences -1.94% and No Violation experiences -1.50%.Such drops in abnormal 
returns after the announcement period may indicate that the market overreacted to the 
acquisitions announcement. Also, the steepness of Violation After Acquisition’s drop in 
abnormal return may indicate that the stock market’s pessimistic prediction of an impending loan 
covenant violation begins to override its optimistic sentiment towards the acquisition. For mean 
cumulative abnormal returns for all time windows for both the equally weighted index and value-
weighted index, see Table 2. 
B. Types of Acquisitions 
 We apply the two-tailed t-tests to the acquisitions’ characteristics of target firm deal size, 
industry match, and deal financing. For target firm deal size, it is evident from Table 3 that No 
Violation’s mean target firm deal size is significantly different from those of Violation Before 
Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition for the 0.05 level of significance. On the other hand, 
Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition are not significantly different. For 
both major industry group match and industry match, Table 4 shows that there are no significant 
differences between sample means. For deal financing, Table 5 shows that only the t-statistics for 
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the mean difference between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation seem significant for 
both cash financing and stock financing. However, we conclude that despite the t-tests, these 
sample means may not be actually significantly different. No Violation’s comparatively very 
large sample size greatly shrinks the standard error for the t-test, and the mean differences of the 
two samples do not seem drastically different in terms of magnitude. 
 From these results, it seems that the only significant mean differences are those for target 
firm deal size between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation, and between Violation 
After Acquisition and No Violation. The target firm deal size is much smaller for Violation 
Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition, than for No Violation. This may be an 
indication that when a firm violated a covenant or is about to violate a covenant, creditors may 
limit the deal size of acquisitions. This is in line with the figure that reveals a dramatic decrease 
in acquisitions after the loan covenant violation date. Overly large acquisitions may be both too 
expensive and too risky, thus absorbing too many cash flows and diminishing firm value. Since 
the other t-test produced insignificant results, we do not reach any strong conclusions for 
industry match and deal financing. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 From our research, it seems that firms undergo significant shifts of corporate governance 
when a loan covenant is violated or about to be violated. Power shifts from management to the 
creditors, as creditors impose stricter rules, such as limiting the size of acquisition targets. The 
stock market likely realizes these shifts in power and views them as beneficial for firm value. 
This favorable perspective is reflected in positive acquisition announcement period abnormal 
returns for acquirers that violate a loan covenant near the announcement date.  
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 Even though our conclusions are supported by convincing results and background 
research, we must realize that there are many factors that come into play when firms violate loan 
covenants and undergo acquisitions. There exist numerous business and economic reasons why 
firms fail to satisfy loan covenants and decide to pursue acquisitions. To extend our research 
further, it may be helpful to examine many of the other acquisition type characteristics, such as 
acquirer size in assets, geographic region, and number of previous acquisitions by the acquirer.  
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Figure 1 – Effect of Financial Covenant Violation on Acquisitions 
This figure presents the mean and median for cash acquisitions scaled by average assets after a 
financial covenant violation occurs for a firm that has not violated in the previous four quarter. 
The violation is first reported at quarter 0, implying that it occurred sometime between quarter -1 
and 0. 
 
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010) 
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Figure 2 – Financial Covenant Violations and Stock Price Performance (Event Time) 
 
This figure displays results from a stock price event study around the occurrence of a new 
covenant violation by estimating the event-study monthly abnormal returns of stocks following 
the report of a new loan covenant violation in their SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing. A new violation is 
a violation by a firm that has not violated in the previous four quarters. The estimates are for 
event months September 1997 through June 2009 and include 3,699 observations. The violation 
occurs at month 0, and the figure shows monthly cumulative average abnormal return estimates 
beginning one year before the violation. Abnormal returns are measured against a four-factor 
return model, measured on a monthly basis, are: (1) the excess return on the NYSE/AMEX 
market return, (2) the difference between the returns on small and big stocks, (3) the return 
performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks, and (4) the return performance of high 
momentum stocks relative to low momentum stocks.  
 
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010) 
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Figure 3 – Financial Covenant Violations and Stock Price Performance (Calendar Time) 
This figure displays cumulative stock returns for a covenant violator portfolio and the implied 
return for a portfolio of all stocks (including non-violators) of similar risk as measured a by four-
factor benchmark model. The figure covers the period September 1997 through March 2010, and 
includes violations reported between September 2007 and June 2009. The covenant violator 
portfolio is formed by purchasing stocks of firms that report a new covenant violation and 
holding the stocks for 2 years. A new violation is a violation by a firm that has not violated in the 
previous four quarters. The stocks are purchased on the first trading day of the month following 
the reported violation, and the portfolio is equally weighted. The implied returns are constructed 
using a 4-factor benchmark portfolio based on: (1) the excess return on the NYSE/AMEX market 
return, (2) the difference between the returns on small and big stocks, (3) the return performance 
of value stocks relative to growth stocks, and (4) the return performance of high momentum 
stocks relative to low momentum stocks. 
 
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010) 
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Figure 4 – Eventus Diagram 
This figure presents how Eventus calculates abnormal returns. The returns from the estimation 
window are used to estimate the parameters, which are used to calculate the abnormal return. 
The event window represents the days for which abnormal returns are calculated. The estimation 
window and event window are chosen by the user.  
 
Source: Gines (2008) 
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Figure 5 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Days -30 to 30 
These two graphs are of the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the three samples Violation 
Before Acquisition, Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, across the time window (-30, 
30). Both graphs’ data are from Eventus, using the market model. The first graph uses the 
equally weighted index, and the second uses the value-weighted index. 
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Figure 6 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Days -3 to 2 
These two graphs are of the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the three samples Violation 
Before Acquisition, Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, across the time window (-3, 
2). Both graphs’ data are from Eventus, using the market model. The first graph uses the equally 
weighted index, and the second uses the value-weighted index. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
This table presents a summary of data that we expand upon and analyze throughout our research. 
For both cumulative abnormal returns and acquisition type characteristics, we reveal the means 
and sample sizes for all three samples. 
 
  
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
(-30,30) Mean CAR 0.03% -3.27% -1.14%
(-3, +2) Mean CAR 3.07% 1.52% 0.72%
Count 517 490 7973
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
(-30,30) Mean CAR -0.13% -3.47% -1.64%
(-3, +2) Mean CAR 3.00% 1.51% 0.65%
Count 517 490 7973
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 151.429 123.226 359.488
Count 412 419 6206
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.296 0.346 0.315
Count 598 569 9555
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.515 0.538 0.523
Count 598 569 9555
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.518 0.587 0.595
Count 510 482 7857
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.322 0.253 0.250
Count 510 482 7857
Market Model, Equally Weighted Index
Market Model, Value-Weighted Index
Acquisition Type Characteristics
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Target Firm Deal Size ($ Mil)
Industry Match
Major Industry Group Match
Cash Financing
Stock Financing
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Table 2 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Various Time Windows 
This table presents mean cumulative returns for the three samples Violation Before Acquisition, 
Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, for various time windows. Both sections use the 
market model. The first section uses the equally weighted index, and the second uses the value-
weighted index. Violation Before Acquisition includes 517 acquisitions, Violation After 
Acquisition includes 490 acquisitions, and No Violation includes 7973 to 7975 acquisitions, 
depending on the time window.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Days Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
(-30,30) 0.03% -3.27% -1.14%
(-3, +2) 3.07% 1.52% 0.72%
(-30, -2) 0.09% -0.11% -0.43%
(+1, +30) -1.53% -3.78% -1.05%
(-1, +1) 2.94% 1.29% 0.64%
(-2, +2) 3.03% 1.38% 0.74%
(-2, +30) 0.53% -2.78% -0.61%
Days Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
(-30,30) -0.13% -3.47% -1.64%
(-3, +2) 3.00% 1.51% 0.65%
(-30, -2) 0.02% 0.28% -0.48%
(+1, +30) -1.94% -4.43% -1.50%
(-1, +1) 2.91% 1.30% 0.61%
(-2, +2) 3.01% 1.35% 0.68%
(-2, +30) 0.09% -3.43% -1.10%
Market Model, Value-Weighted Index
Market Model, Equally Weighted Index
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Table 3 – Target Firm Deal Size, Mean Differences 
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the two-
tailed t-tests used. The target firm deal size is measured in $ millions of assets. The t-statistics for 
statistically significant mean differences at the 0.05 significance level are highlighted in yellow. 
 
 
 
  
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 151.429 123.226 359.488
Count 412 419 6206
VBA & VAA VBA & NV VAA & NV
Difference 28.202 -208.060 -236.262
t 0.653 -4.068 -6.871
Target Firm Deal Size ($ Mil)
30 
 
Table 4 – Major Industry Group Match and Industry Match, Mean Differences 
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the two-
tailed t-tests used. Major Industry Group Match and Industry Match are both dummy variables. 
The t-statistics for statistically significant mean differences at the 0.05 significance level are 
highlighted in yellow. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.515 0.538 0.523
Count 598 569 9555
VBA & VAA VBA & NV VAA & NV
Difference -0.023 -0.008 0.014
t -0.015 -0.401 0.664
Major Industry Group Match
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.296 0.346 0.315
Count 598 569 9555
VBA & VAA VBA & NV VAA & NV
Difference -0.050 -0.019 0.031
t -0.041 -0.982 1.526
Industry Match
31 
 
Table 5 – Cash Financing and Stock Financing, Mean Differences 
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the two-
tailed t-tests used. Cash Financing and Stock Financing are both dummy variables.  
 
 
 
 
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.518 0.587 0.595
Count 510 482 7857
VBA & VAA VBA & NV VAA & NV
Difference -0.069 -0.077 -0.008
t -0.045 -3.383 -0.335
Cash Financing
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
Mean 0.322 0.253 0.250
Count 510 482 7857
VBA & VAA VBA & NV VAA & NV
Difference 0.068 0.072 0.003
t 0.059 3.378 0.166
Stock Financing
